ABSTRACT. In bargaining environments with uncertain disagreement or "impasse" outcomes (e.g., litigation or labor strike outcomes), there is an identification problem that confounds data interpretation. Specifically, the minimally acceptable settlement value from a risk-averse (risk-loving) but unbiased-belief bargainer is empirically indistinguishable from what one could get with risk-neutrality and pessimistically (optimistically) biased beliefs. This article reports results from a controlled bargaining experiment where data on both risk attitude and beliefs under uncertainty are generated in order to assess their relative importance in bargaining experiment outcomes. The average lab subject is risk-averse, yet optimistic with respect to uncertainty, which is consistent with existing studies that examine each in isolation. I also find that the effects of optimism dominate those of risk-aversion. Optimistic bargainers are significantly more likely to dispute and have aggressive final bargaining positions. Dispute rates are not statistically affected by risk attitude, but there is some evidence that risk aversion leads to a weakened bargaining position. Though additional research is needed to understand the limits of extending these results, a key implication follows. In uncertainty environments where optimism dominates, increased settlement rates are more likely achieved by minimizing impasse uncertainty (to limit the potential for optimism) rather than maximizing uncertainty (to weaken the reservation point of risk-averse bargainers), as has been argued in the dispute resolution literature.
INTRODUCTION
Theoretical research on bargaining has produced a well-known result that risk aversion will harm an individual's bargaining position, ceteris paribus. This result has been shown in a variety of game-theoretic models, including the highly influential models in Nash (1950) and Rubinstein (1982) .
1 Analysis of bargainer decision-making under uncertainty, such as in Farber and Katz (1979) , produces a similar result in the sense that risk aversion in an expected utility framework lowers a bargainer's threat point (or certainty equivalent for the lottery). Laboratory data generally confirms the theoretical prediction that risk aversion harms bargaining outcomes, although estimated risk aversion effects are sometimes weak or dominated by other features of the bargaining situation, such as focal points or explicit disagreement costs (see Murnighan et al., 1988; Farber et al., 1990) .
A separate strand of literature examines the effects of biased beliefs on bargaining outcomes under uncertainty. Though there exists evidence of pessimism in some environments (e.g., Clark and Friesen, 2005; Hoelzl and Rustichini, 2005) , a good deal of research in psychology and economics has documented decision-maker overconfidence or beliefoptimism in a variety of settings.
2 Babcock and Loewenstein (1997) argue that many results from laboratory and field evidence on bargaining impasse (i.e., disagreement) are consistent with the notion that bargainers are overconfident or possess a self-serving bias in negotiations. Though such optimism may take more than one form-optimism about relative bargaining skills versus optimism about the likely decision rendered by a judge or arbitrator-this article is specifically concerned with the optimistic belief that bargainers have over the uncertain outcome from impasse. Litigants, for example, are likely to have uncertainty about the final payoffs of going to trial versus settling out-of-court. There is also uncertainty surrounding disputed outcomes when they are settled through arbitration, which is increasingly used as a replacement for litigation for many civil disputes. If a labor union chooses to strike (i.e., dispute) rather than agree to management's contract offer, then the ultimate payoff outcome is typically not known with certainty by either management or the union. In general, one could consider that these environments all
